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Abstract
The increasing use of encrypted data within file storage and in network communications leaves investigators with many challenges.
One of the most challenging is the Tor protocol, as its main focus is to protect the privacy of the user, in both its local footprint
within a host and over a network connection. The Tor browser, though, can leave behind digital artefacts which can be used by an
investigator. This paper outlines an experimental methodology and provides results for evidence trails which can be used within
real-life investigations.
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1. Introduction
Use of the Tor Browser and network became mainstream
in 2013, after the arrest and conviction of Ross Ulbricht -
the alleged mastermind behind darknet marketplace Silk Road
(Dewey, 2013). Prior to Ulbricht’s arrest, a former American
National Security Agency (NSA) contractor, Edward Snowden,
had leaked classified files to The Guardian newspaper concern-
ing the extent of mass surveillance by global intelligence ser-
vices (Greenwald et al., 2013). This information, later known
as the Snowden revelations, ignited a global debate surrounding
the lack of privacy offered by digital communication.
Motivated by fear of privacy-intrusion, members of the pub-
lic and cyber criminals alike increasingly turned to the Tor
Browser, tempted by its anonymising features. A new influx
of users and increasing media attention catalysed academic re-
search into the effectiveness of Tor and its ability to protect user
privacy. The majority of this research concentrated on improve-
ments to the performance and scalability of the network, as well
as the investigation of remote attacks intended to unmask users
(Nordberg, 2015). However, the question is whether anonymity
is maintained where an adversary is local, rather than remote?
This paper assesses the effectiveness of the Tor Browser in
protecting the user against such an adversary by conducting a
forensic analysis of the software and its interaction with the host
operating system (OS). Our contribution is threefold:
• We show that artefacts proving installation/use of the
browser are generated in memory and on disk in the form
of default bookmarks. These artefacts are attributable to
a particular user, uniquely identify the Tor Browser, and
persist through uninstallation and logout.
• Furthermore, user activity within Tor is written to the Win-
dows Registry as a consequence of recent updates to Win-
dows 10. This allows a forensic adversary to determine the
titles of pages visited using the browser.
• From the results of our forensic audit, we devise a forensic
methodology.
Our approach simulates typical web browsing activity with
Tor. Using virtualisation and a pre-determined browsing proto-
col allows artefact recovery with static and live forensic tech-
niques, such as process monitoring, keyword searching and file
carving, with the aid of Autopsy and the Volatility Framework.
Static analysis reveals significant leakage of user activity in
the snapshots of machines used to perform the testing. This
includes HTTP header information, web page titles and an in-
stance of a URL. Further, live analysis identified traces of Tor
processes even after the user had closed and uninstalled the
browser and logged out. The absolute path to the browser ex-
ecutable was seen in RAM on several occasions, including the
username of the user running the browser and the device from
which it was run.
As a result, Tor is easily identified, cannot be securely deleted
and activity from within a browsing session is determinable,
suggesting that defence against a local adversary has not been
fully addressed by the developers. This finding significantly
expands on previous research, where artefacts pertaining to use
of the browser, but not browsing history, were found.
2. Background
The novel approach to anonymous networking which Tor
is (in)famous for has attracted interest from the cybersecu-
rity community, largely resulting in research concerning de-
anonymisation of users from a network perspective. However,
it is the intention of the Tor Project to protect the user from both
network and local adversaries. This is achieved through the im-
plementation of features and design choices intended to obfus-
cate network activity and employ anti-forensics techniques to
prevent browsing session data from being written to disk (Perry
et al., 2018).
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2.1. Tor Overview
Tor, an acronym for The Onion Router, refers to both a
browser and a networking protocol developed by The Tor
Project. The purpose of the Tor network is to mask the orig-
inal source of Internet traffic by redirecting data from source to
destination through a series of randomly chosen, volunteer-run
servers (Torproject.org, 2018). Unlike regular web browsing,
this obfuscates the user’s IP address, ensuring that their identity
is not disclosed to the websites they visit. By redirecting the
traffic through encrypted channels, data is also protected from
passive traffic analysis.
Use of the network alone does not guarantee anonymity,
making the Tor Browser Bundle (TBB) a necessary component
in the privacy-oriented architecture (Torproject.org, 2018). The
TBB is an extended support release (ESR) of Mozilla’s Fire-
fox browser, bundled with mandatory add-ons which protect
user anonymity. The browser’s design philosophy states that
the TBB should protect the user from known web attacks de-
signed to reveal a user’s identity and also minimise the amount
of browsing data written to disk (Perry et al., 2018). To enable
this, plugins such as NoScript, which protects the user from
malicious code on websites, are used by default, as is Firefox’s
Private Browsing mode. Forcing Private Browsing mode means
that web history is not saved to disk by the browser itself, which
should make it difficult for a forensic adversary to determine
websites visited (Mozilla.org, 2019).
2.2. Motivation
Users of the Tor Browser and network rely on the perceived
anonymity offered by the Tor Project. This research is moti-
vated by the idea that little importance has been placed on pro-
tecting the user’s anonymity from a forensic perspective, both
by the Tor Project and by academic research in this area. If
user anonymity is easily compromised by a forensic adversary,
the browser could be considered a weak link in Tor’s privacy-
focused architecture. Whilst it is not currently illegal to use
Tor in many states, shifts in attitudes towards the browser could
take place as a reaction to political events, or as a wider drive
for censorship. Moreover, users of Tor who see the browser
as a tool for the greater good, such as journalists and political
dissidents, may be easily identified if the browser leaves obvi-
ous traces of its use on computing systems. This could lead
to persecution and further surveillance, regardless of legality.
Understandably, the same features which make Tor attractive to
the aforementioned users, also make it attractive to those who
wish to cause harm. Therefore, a greater understanding of the
forensic implications of using Tor is required by law enforce-
ment investigating a range of digital crimes. It is this complex
societal impact which has inspired the subject of this paper.
2.3. Traditional Browser Forensics
Traditional web browsers record a significant amount of data
from a browsing session - particularly in the default browsing
mode. Web browser forensics involves the recovery of brows-
ing artefacts which reveal information regarding a suspect’s on-
line activity. Browser forensics has become increasingly impor-
tant for investigators as search history, download activity and
page views can aid understanding of the criminal motive.
Like other popular browsers, Firefox, the TBB’s underlying
browser engine, stores history, download and cookie informa-
tion in SQLite databases, generally in clear text. This allows
forensic investigators to easily retrieve browsing information
(Roussas, 2009; Shepherd, 2018; Noorulla, 2014). Acknowl-
edging this lack of user privacy, browser developers introduced
a private browsing mode, intended to limit or, ideally, elim-
inate browsing artefacts being written to disk. In a compre-
hensive study, Montasari and Peltola (2015) found that the ex-
tent to which this aim has been achieved varies widely between
browsers, with Firefox considered the second-most secure of
the four mainstream browsers tested.
Using a methodology which incorporated virtualised Win-
dows platforms and the use of Autopsy to analyse snapshots,
Montasari and Peltola (2015) attempted to recover cached web
pages, web browsing history, download history, visited URLs
and search terms from the target computer after performing a
pre-defined browsing protocol using each browser’s version of
private browsing. A variety of typical activities, involving dif-
ferent types of web content, were covered:
1. Searching for and viewing a YouTube video.
2. Using Google to find a web page and then performing an-
other search on the page.
3. Downloading a Facebook profile picture.
4. Searching and viewing an Amazon item.
5. Searching for and viewing a PDF document using Google.
The analysis was split into two stages; examining firstly com-
mon and uncommon locations on a hard drive and secondly the
contents of the computer’s volatile memory (RAM). Of the four
browsers tested, Firefox was deemed relatively secure, although
traces of search terms issued during the browsing protocol were
discovered in pagefile.sys and the profile picture downloaded
from Facebook was also discovered using file carving.
These results confirm earlier work which found artefacts in-
cluding search terms and URLs from private browsing ses-
sions in pagefile.sys (David and Hargreaves, 2012; Findlay and
Leimich, 2014) and in RAM (Aggarwal et al., 2010; Findlay
and Leimich, 2014), and contradict Mozilla’s claims that Fire-
fox leaves no traces after termination of a private browsing ses-
sion (Mozilla.org, 2019).
2.4. Overview of Tor Forensics Research
Any weaknesses in Mozilla’s implementation of private
browsing suggest that the TBB could be susceptible to simi-
lar exploitation unless the developers have managed to mitigate
these vulnerabilities. Acknowledging the need for a forensic
audit, Sandvik (2013) of the Tor Project conducted a cross-
platform forensic analysis of the TBB on OSX, Linux and
Windows. The TBB ”aims to ensure that the user is able to
completely and safely remove the bundle without leaving other
traces on her computer” (Sandvik, 2013). However, the anal-
ysis results showed that the default behaviour of the operat-
ing system hosting the TBB could compromise user anonymity
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through its generation of artefacts related to features such as
prefetching, paging and index searching, negating the anti-
forensics measures implemented by the developers.
Darcie et al. (2014) found that analysis of the Windows Reg-
istry could determine the presence of the TBB after uninstal-
lation, while Epifani et al. (2015) discovered during a real-life
case study, where a rogue employee’s laptop was seized, that
Tor use on the target computer was proven by artefacts residing
in Tor’s install directory as well as the behaviour of Windows
prefetching. Hence the Tor Project either does not or cannot
prevent a trail of evidence being created by the host OS.
As the TBB was found to be successful in avoiding brows-
ing data being written to the hard disk (besides in low-RAM
situations) (Darcie et al., 2014), a static forensic analysis would
likely yield evidence of installation and use. This could be ad-
vantageous to an investigator wishing to prove the use of Tor
over other browsers, however, lacking artefacts of browsing his-
tory, it does not offer a picture of a subject’s activity within Tor.
A requirement for live forensic analysis became evident.
Dayalamurthy (2013) evaluated the work of previous foren-
sic research using RAM dumps and suggested that this live
forensics approach would be feasible when analysing the use
of the TBB and attempting to de-anonymise Tor users. Her re-
search proposed a forensic methodology which includes the use
of the Volatility framework for memory analysis, along with the
recovery of web graphics and analysis of the Windows Registry.
However, this methodology was never tested.
Darcie et al. (2014) discovered that by creating a RAM dump
of a target system, indexing it and searching for the keyword
Tor, numerous hits were returned in a computer used to down-
load Tor, a computer where Tor was used and finally, a com-
puter where Tor had been used and then uninstalled. This
method of performing string searches on RAM captures echoes
the methodology used by Montasari and Peltola (2015). War-
ren (2017) later expanded on this analysis of RAM by us-
ing the Volatility Framework, with the addition of community-
developed plugins, to conduct an analysis of the RAM of a Win-
dows 10 VMWare virtual machine. In doing so, evidence of Tor
was found through the identification of Tor DLLs, environment
variables, SIDs and command line usage.
3. Methodology
3.1. Design considerations
Throughout this project, forensic analysis is intended to have
two clear aims:
1. Expanding on previous research to confirm that the exis-
tence and use of the Tor Browser is still determinable in
Windows 10, and
2. Proving that artefacts from the Tor browsing protocol can
be recovered from the target computer.
Live analysis of an application during runtime is particularly
beneficial in order to understand how the host operating system
and application interact. As the design efforts of the Tor project
have focused on preventing writes to disk (Perry et al., 2018), a
live analysis could potentially yield more information pertain-
ing to the browsing session. Using an earlier version of Tor
(3.6.1), Darcie et al. (2014) found evidence of web browsing in
the form of JPEG and HTML files in live forensics but dead-box
(static) forensics was unsuccessful. In a previous live forensics
analysis of the Firefox browser, artefacts from a private brows-
ing session were recovered from memory whilst the browsing
session was open, and - to a lesser extent after the browsing
session had closed (Findlay and Leimich, 2014). This showed
that Firefox was able to terminate running processes, effectively
flushing memory of artefacts of the browsing protocol when the
user closed the Private Browsing window. However, whether or
not this is also true for the TBB has not been established; this
will be taken into account in our methodology.
To build upon previous research, our approach has been de-
signed to answer the following questions:
• Does Tor manage to protect the user by flushing evidence
of its use from RAM when the browsing session is closed?
• Can Tor use be detected at four key moments; whilst
the browser window is open, after closing the browsing
window, after deleting the installation directory/associated
files, and after the user has logged out?
• Are files from the browsing protocol still recoverable in
live forensics using Tor 7.5.2, the version current at the
time of writing?
Answers to the above should protect the user’s anonymity
from an adversary who manages to seize a personal computer
during or shortly after Tor use, as well as after the seizure of
a shared computer. Timing is a key parameter when design-
ing a live forensics methodology. Figure 1 gives an overview
of the experimental methodology used in this project, clearly
showing the timing of RAM captures for live forensics and vir-
tual machine snapshots for static forensics. The experiments
were repeated using Tor in mobile mode, i.e. run from a thumb
drive, echoing Findlay and Leimich (2014) who found that mo-
bile browsing reduced the artefacts left behind on the host, and
using private browsing mode in native Firefox as a control.
Inspired by Montasari and Peltola (2015), our test protocol
mimics a user’s browsing session with a variety of actions (i.e.
searching, interacting with web forms, downloading, streaming
media):
1. Type theguardian.co.uk into the address bar and view the
page.
2. Go to https://support.mozilla.org and enter profile folder
into the search box (submission to a web form).
3. Go to images.google.com, search for moog mother 32 and
download the first image.
4. Go to https://soundcloud.com/monolake/liveego1999 and
stream the first three minutes of the embedded audio.
5. At ebay.co.uk, search for nike air force 1 and view the first
item.
The URLs and search terms were selected to include unusual
strings to facilitate later keyword searches without false posi-
tives.
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Figure 1: Overview of the Experimental Methodology
3.2. RAM Capture and Analysis Tools
VirtualBox supports the exporting of the contents of RAM,
provided the virtual machine is started from the command line
with debugging mode enabled. The .pgmtophysfile filename
command can then be issued at any point to dump the contents
of RAM. The resulting ELF 64 file can then be analysed by the
Volatility Framework (http://www.volatilityfoundation.org).
Volatility was chosen due to its versatility as a command line
tool, the wide range of plugins available for it and its effective
use in previous Tor forensics research (Warren, 2017). With its
vast array of plugins, Volatility is highly effective in analysing
the state of memory at different points in time, building a com-
prehensive picture of the use of physical memory by an appli-
cation. To address the aims stated in Section 3.1, the following
Volatility plugins were chosen (Volatility Foundation, 2017):
• cmdline: displays command line arguments for currently
running processes.
• dlllist: displays loaded DLLs for a given process.
• dumpfiles: extracts memory-mapped and cached files.
• envars: displays the environment variables used by pro-
cesses.
• pslist: prints all running processes by following the EPRO-
CESS kernel structure.
• pstree: prints the running processes as a tree, identifies
parent and child processes.
• shellbags: displays shellbag information taken from ap-
propriate registry keys.
• timeliner: creates a timeline from various artefacts in
memory.
A common practice in live forensics is to observe running
processes through the use of tools such as procmon (Darcie
et al., 2014). Processes are assigned unique IDs (PIDs) in Win-
dows and can be used to confirm that an application was run-
ning during the time of the analysis. Once the PID of a process
is discovered, the process can then be searched in the output
of Volatility’s plugins, allowing an investigator to map its be-
haviour at certain points in time. Live analysis will take place
first so that knowledge of the results which identify Tor use
(for example, the names of DLLs) can then be used in a static
analysis. Since it is considered likely that individually dumped
RAM captures will expose contents of the browsing session (i.e.
through caching), this was deemed an important inclusion to
this project, particularly as Warren (2017) was unable to do so
due to time constraints. Volatility’s dumpfiles plugin will be
used to achieve this and the resulting files analysed manually.
This approach, inspired by Dayalamurthy (2013), should show
changes to the Windows Registry, paths to the Tor install direc-
tory and contents of the browsing protocol.
4. Results
4.1. Live Forensics
RAM was captured at four key moments in the experiment:
1. After the browsing scenario with the browser window still
open.
2. After closing the browser window.
3. After dragging the installation directory to the Recycle Bin
and emptying (simulating an uninstall).
4. After the user logs out.
This should allow conclusions to be drawn which answer the
questions asked in Section 3.1. As we found the artefacts left
behind to decrease after each of the four stages, we present the
results from the final stage.
After uninstalling the TBB and logging out, the Tor-related
processes had been ended, but outputs from parsing the volatile
memory with cmdline, pslist and dlllist plugins still showed the
firefox.exe process with PID 4384; psscan and timeliner ad-
ditionally showed timestamps (Figure 2a,b), while envars and
shellbags produced nothing notable. While these findings could
have been caused by a vanilla installation of Firefox, the output
of the pstree plugin (Figure 2c) includes the absolute path to
the Tor install directory, tying the process to the Tor browser.
Via the PID and PPID, the start and end times from psscan and
timeliner can then also be attributed to Tor.
4
(a) psscan
(b) timeliner
(c) pstree
Figure 2: Selected Volatility Plugin Outputs - After logout
Figure 3: Results of monolake string search, reflecting the title of the webpage
(<title>Monolake Live at Ego Du¨sseldorf June 5 1999 by monolake |Free Lis-
tening on SoundCloud</title>) suffixed with - Tor Browser
4.2. Static Forensics
Snapshots of the VM were taken after three key stages in the
experiment to enable a static forensic analysis to assess Tor’s
ability to prevent writing data to disk. Again, we focus on
the final snapshot, taken after the uninstallation/deletion of Tor
(Figure 1).
4.2.1. Keyword Searches
The first step in the analysis was to carry out keyword
searches for monolake, soundcloud, the guardian and moog
mother 32 to determine if and where these strings could be
found in the forensic image. All search strings were found
to appear in the same three files, with several occurrences in
each file: NTUSER.DAT, ntuser.dat.LOG1 (a log of changes to
NTUSER.DAT) and MEMORY.DMP. The only exception was
moog mother 32, which did not appear in ntuser.dat.LOG1 but
instead appeared in unallocated space, suggesting that the log
Figure 4: String search for moog mother 32 in NTUSER.DAT (extract)
may have been flushed. Closer inspection of the contents of
the three files revealed that all had exactly the same content,
suggesting that the content of NTUSER.DAT was being logged
and then replicated in MEMORY.DMP. Surprisingly, the file
contents included the entire page title of each website visited
suffixed with - Tor Browser as well as the absolute path to the
Tor install directory, clearly showing the username (40187070)
as well as referencing firefox.exe within the Tor Browser direc-
tory. Figure 3 shows the monolake results as an example.
The keyword matches for the string moog mother 32 reflect
its use in a Google search (Figure 4). Interestingly, the page title
contained the German word for search, Suche, suggesting that
the Tor exit node was located in a German-speaking country.
The Downloads folder and explorer.exe also appear in this con-
text, reflecting the saving of the downloaded image. As with the
other keyword searches, the absolute path to the Tor directory
is shown, with the Firefox executable clearly identified.
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(a) Ebay URL and Private Browsing evidence in .dll and .edb Files
(b) Ebay URL and HTTP Header Information in .reg Files
(c) References to Tor Install Directory (extract)
(d) Obfs4 Bridging IP Addresses (extract)
Figure 5: Artefacts in Unallocated Space - After Delete
4.2.2. Unallocated Space
Several artefacts were recovered from unallocated space us-
ing Autopsy’s carver module. When searching for the string
’clot’ from the browsing protocol, six .dll, .edb and .reg files
were discovered in unallocated space. Closer examination of
these files showed considerable browsing data leakage: all con-
tained the Ebay URL visited; the .dll and .edb files also refer-
enced Private Browsing while the .reg file included remnants of
HTTP header information (Figure 5a-b). Further searching of
unallocated space uncovered references to the Tor installation
directory and the obfs4 bridging IP addresses (Figure 5c, d).
The browsing data found in NTUSER.DAT was also replicated
in unallocated space. This may have occurred as a result of the
machine crashing, however further analysis would need to be
conducted to prove this.
4.3. Analysis of NTUSER.DAT
As static analysis revealed an abundance of artefacts in the
user profile’s NTUSER.DAT registry hive, but Autopsy’s pars-
ing of registry is limited to string searches, NTUSER.DAT hives
from several VM snapshots were extracted for further analysis.
Firstly, a string search for ’Tor Browser’ was carried out
on the NTUSER.DAT file from the Tor After Browse snapshot
with the free forensic tool Registry Explorer. Figure 6a shows
the results of this search. Of particular interest is the Key Path
column which shows the paths of the six different Registry keys
where the string was found.
The browsing data strings previously seen in Autopsy occur
in HKEY CURRENT USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\
CurrentVersion\CloudStore\Store\Cache\DefaultAccount\
$$windows.data.taskflow.shellactivities\Current (the shellac-
tivities key for short), making it the most interesting. The
value, of REG BINARY type, contains page titles from
the pages visited during the browsing protocol in Unicode
(a) Tor, Standard Mode
(b) TOR, Portable Mode
(c) Firefox, Private Mode
Figure 6: NTUSER.DAT Keys containing Search Strings
(a) TOR, Standard Mode
(b) TOR, Portable Mode
(c) Firefox, Private Browsing
Figure 7: Extracts of the shellactivities registry key showing titles of browsing
tabs
as well as the absolute path to the application generat-
ing the browsing tabs, C:\Users\40187070\Desktop\Tor
Browser\Browser\firefox.exe (Figure 7a).
To test whether writing of data to the Registry still occurs
when the browser is run from an external device (in portable
mode), the same analysis was performed on the NTUSER.DAT
file extracted from a Tor Portable snapshot. While the string
’Tor Browser’ was found in only two keys (Figure 6b), the
shellactivities key again contained significant evidence from the
browsing protocol including page titles and the absolute path to
the Firefox executable within Tor’s installation directory (Fig-
ure 7b). The latter, E:\Tor Browser\Browser\firefox.exe, re-
flects the use of an external device, more details about which
can be found by correlating the drive letter with registry keys
such as USBSTOR.
In addition to the shellactivities key, the key
HKCU\Software\Microsoft\InternetExplorer\LowRegistry\
Audio\PolicyConfig\PropertyStore\<value> contained the
’Tor Browser’ string in both the snapshot of Tor being run
locally and in portable mode. Closer examination of the value
data showed that it contains part of the path to the Firefox
executable within the TOR browser installation directory
(Figure 8). This key is likely used in the handling of audio
by the host computer and the data would have been written
to it when audio was streamed from the Internet as part of
the browsing protocol. While the shellactivities key is a more
comprehensive record of user activity, this audio key could
corroborate the evidence, providing the user has used it to
stream audio.
As a control, the same experiment was performed using the
’vanilla’ Firefox browser in private browsing mode on a fresh
VM, with a snapshot taken after executing the pre-determined
browsing activities. As this control could not contain any ref-
erences to the Tor browser, ’monolake’ was used as the search
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Figure 8: Tor Browser String in \Audio\PolicyConfig\PropertyStore - TOR
Portable
string. The only match was in the shellactivities key (Figure
6c). Further inspection of this key in a hex editor revealed the
same data leakage seen in the two Tor snapshots (Figure 7c).
4.4. Decoding the shellactivities key contents
It is evident that, under Windows 10, browsing data from
user sessions is written to non-volatile storage, specifically the
shellactivities registry key. This data leakage occurs regardless
whether Tor, built upon the Extended Support Release (ESR)
of Firefox, is used or Firefox’s default Private Browsing mode,
and also when a portable browser is used. This consistency sug-
gests that the observed data leakage is a result of how the Op-
erating System handles applications rather than some anomaly
in the operation of Tor or Firefox. As a result, the anonymity-
preserving intentions of both the Tor Project and Mozilla’s pri-
vate browsing mode are negated. Conversely, the shellactivities
registry key is likely to contain valuable forensic artefacts and
thus warrants further investigation.
The parent of the shellactivities registry key, Cloudstore,
does not exist in Windows 7, nor in the 1511 update of Windows
10. It first appears in the Windows 10 with the Anniversary Up-
date, (1607 / 1603 in Win Education), but at that point it was
not populated, having no subkeys or values. In Windows 10
machines running the Creator’s Update 1703, the CloudStore
key exists and has numerous subkeys that are populated with
values, including the shellactivities key.
The data within the shellactivities is of REG BINARY type,
i.e. hexadecimal. It appears to have an internal structure, which
warrants decoding fully as this would allow plugins for forensic
tools such as Regripper, Encase etc to be created.
In Figure 9, we have colour-coded the start of the contents of
this key after TOR was run in standard mode, uninstalled and
the user logged out, in order to expose the internal structure.
• The key header starts with 0x02000000; this is followed
by an eight-byte Windows Filetime Timestamp (high-
lighted grey, here representing 3 April 2018 14:09:47),
then 4 bytes of zero and 8 bytes of values (here
0x43420100CB0A0A14).
• The first record entry starts at offset 0x18.
• Every record starts with a record header signature of
0xD214 (buff), followed by one byte (here consistently
0x39, but varies in other examples; this could be a type,
length or offset indicator of some sort).
• This is followed by the absolute path to executable (blue-
grey, variable length), then 8 bytes which are consis-
tently 0xC61FD28310D2230B (pink), the name of the ex-
ecutable (green, variable length), 0xD228 (purple), 1 vari-
able byte.
• After the above, Page title (turquoise) + 0xC632 (orange)
+ 5 bytes + 0xEAF2E901 + 0xC63C (yellow) + 5 bytes +
0xEAF2E901 + 0xCA500000 (dark gold).
• The underlined could be 1 byte + 8 byte timestamp of
some sort - but see conversion attempts above.
• This structure looks to be consistent for the actual web
pages viewed, but the final few records vary somewhat.
• If this is correct, the individual entries are delimited by
0xD21439 header and 0xCA500000 footer, and internal
components separated by specific values as well, so size
of entry would not need to be stored.
• This entry header and footer might then be searchable,
e.g in registry entries, or possibly unallocated space if
deleted? (but I don’t know how registry deals with deletion
- possibly internally).
Figure 9: Internal structure of the shellactivities Key contents
5. Findings
5.1. Proposed Forensic Methodology
The interactions between Tor and Windows described in Sec-
tion 4 can be used to design a generalised forensic methodology
for identifying the use of TOR and Web pages visited using
TOR or Private Browsing.
• Where possible, take a RAM dump. Analyse with Volatil-
ity’s psscan, pstree and timeliner plugins to (a) establish
the use of TOR and (b) find the username. This will also
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reveal timestamps and can be carried out even after the
user has uninstalled TOR and logged out. Where they ex-
ist, pagefile.sys or hiberfile.sys can be used instead of a
RAM dump. The analysis of all three of these data sources
from the same system could result in the recovery of differ-
ent, but nonetheless relevant - and corroborative or compli-
mentary - evidence.
• From non-volatile storage, extract the NTUSER.DAT reg-
istry hive of the previously identified user, or, failing this,
of all users.
• Extract the contents of the shellactivities key. Search for
Tor and/or firefox to find the titles of web pages visited.
Similarly, a search for other browser executables will re-
veal visited pages even if private browsing was used.
• A keyword search for ’obfs4’ in unallocated space can re-
veal bridging IP addresses that may have been used by
TOR.
5.2. Live Forensics
The live forensics methodology in this project showed that
by using the Volatility Framework and associated plugins, four
processes which can be attributed to Tor are created at runtime.
These processes are as follows:
• firefox.exe: two occurrences of this process were seen.
• tor.exe.
• obfs4proxy.exe: it is unlikely this would have appeared
had the obfs4 proxy not been used.
Whilst the names of these processes are obvious, the output
of several of the Volatility Framework plugins also revealed the
absolute path to the installation directory where the browser ex-
ecutable resides - providing further indication of Tor use. In do-
ing so, the disk from which the browser was run, the username
of the user running the browser, and the name of the browser
can be clearly seen. This means that by using the Volatility
Framework on a RAM dump seized whilst the browsing ses-
sion is still active, a forensic adversary can positively identify
the use of Tor.
After termination of the session, The Tor Browser manages
to end tor.exe, obfs4proxy.exe and one of the firefox.exe pro-
cesses. This makes it significantly more difficult for a forensic
adversary to confirm that Tor was running on the machine at
the time of seizure and coincides with the behaviour of Fire-
fox observed by Findlay and Leimich (2014). Despite this, one
firefox.exe process persisted. Although the process can still be
seen, the environment variables, command line arguments, and
DLLs which were attributable to this and the other three pro-
cesses could no longer be identified after session termination.
This suggests that the persisting firefox.exe process could not
be fully terminated by closing the browser window and now
exists in a traceable but inactive state. Regardless, the output
of Volatility’s pstree plugin still managed to attribute it to Tor
by identifying the absolute path to the install directory. With-
out this finding, it would be impossible to determine that this
process had originated from Tor and not a regular installation
of Firefox.
This behaviour continued even after the user logged-out,
proving the pstree plugin to be invaluable when attempting to
prove the use of Tor on a shared computer.
In summary, Tor use can be easily detected using live foren-
sics, particularly when the browsing session is still active. En-
suring that the browsing session is closed after use helps to
conceal the fact that Tor was used. However, an artefact (fire-
fox.exe) remains detectable in RAM after closure, deletion, and
log-out. It is likely that the traceable artefact is the result of an
anomaly in Firefox’s handling of running processes. This be-
lief is strengthened by the fact that Tor manages to remove all
evidence of the processes directly attributed to its browser, yet
one Firefox process remains. Perhaps this abnormality was in-
troduced in an update of Firefox’s Extended Support Release,
or it may even be an unforeseen result of the interaction be-
tween Tor’s plugins and the underlying browser. Nonetheless,
it shows that reliance on a third-party browser can introduce
problems which undermine user anonymity.
To expand on this, an examination of the files dumped from
the contents of RAM will need to be performed. This will deter-
mine whether evidence of the browsing protocol is also present
in RAM, a significantly greater finding than the identification
of running processes. Unfortunately, time-constraints made this
impossible in this project, an evaluation of which follows in a
later section.
5.3. Static Forensics
5.3.1. Browsing Data Leakage
Perhaps the most interesting and unexpected conclusion of
this project is that Tor does, in fact, write browsing data to
disk. Artefacts from the browsing protocol, including HTTP
header information, titles of web pages, and an instance of a
typed URL were found in several Registry files. This means
that use of static forensics by forensic investigators is poten-
tially more worthwhile than examining the contents of RAM,
at least for this version of the browser. Epifani et al. (2015) and
Darcie et al. (2014) both mention the Registry as an area where
Tor evidence could be recovered. In the Registry, Darcie et al.
(2014) identified evidence of Tor presence, but not of browsing
data. However, their searches were limited in only including the
keyword Tor. Similarly, Epifani et al. (2015) showed that Tor
could be identified in the NTUSER.DAT Registry hive, within
the User Assist Key. Yet, they determined that only the number
and time of execution could be found. Therefore, the findings
of this research which show that the majority of the browsing
protocol can be recovered from NTUSER.DAT are particularly
significant. This suggests that in the versions between 4.0.2
(Darcie et al., 2014) and 7.5.0, a design change occurred which
has led to this data leakage.
The vast majority of the browsing protocol was found in the
NTUSER.DAT Windows Registry file. This makes it possible
for a forensic adversary to reconstruct the activities of the user
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in relation to the browser. It was unclear what caused this in-
formation to be written to that area of the Registry, however
multiple.reg files which are used to add changes to the Registry
were found in the snapshot taken after the browser had been
deleted. These files contained an Ebay URL visited during the
browsing protocol, making it likely that some aspect of Tor was
writing the contents of memory to the Registry. This is backed-
up by the discovery of the ntuser.dat.LOG1 file, this file logs
changes to the NTUSER.DAT Registry file and contained the
same browsing data-leakage.
5.3.2. Firefox Artefacts
The two SQLite databases used by Firefox to track cookies
and history (cookies.sqlite & places.sqlite) were both recover-
able from the file system after deletion. Cookies.sqlite con-
tained nothing of relevance but its existence could indicate that
Tor was installed on the computer - if it could be proven that it
did not come from a regular Firefox installation. Places.sqlite
contained no information about the browsing protocol, how-
ever, it did contain entries for the Tor Project’s blog and a Learn
About Tor page. This seems counter-productive when design-
ing a browser which is designed to be anonymous. The develop-
ers of the Tor Project may see this as a trade-off between secu-
rity and usability, yet the fact that it can still be recovered after
deletion is further proof that the browser is incapable of being
securely deleted. Since the use of Tor is not currently illegal
in most countries, mere identification of the browser may not
be considered significant. However, these artefacts may have
forensic value when trying to prove that Tor was used over an-
other browser or as part of a wider investigation.
6. Key Findings
This section summarizes some of the key findings.
6.1. Live Forensics
• Four processes can be attributed to Tor whilst the browser
is open.
• Use of the bundled obfs4 proxy (used to bridge connec-
tions to the Tor network) can be detected.
• After the user terminates the browsing session, only one
Firefox process remains.
• Using the Volatility Framework, the path to the browser
and the run time can be identified. Even after the user
has closed the browsing window, deleted the browser and
logged-out.
• As a result of finding the absolute path to the browser, the
username, location of the browser and use of Tor versus
Firefox can be confirmed.
6.2. Static Forensics
The following are observations for static forensics:
• The design aim of preventing Tor from writing to disk
(Perry et al., 2018) is not achieved in this version.
– Configuration files, downloaded files, and browser-
related data are recoverable from the file system.
– Significant data-leakage from the browsing session
occurred: HTTP header information, titles of web
pages and an instance of a URL were found in reg-
istry files, system files, and unallocated space.
– The data-leakage contained the German word for
’search’ in reference to a Google search. This hints at
the locale of the Tor server used to exit the network
(exit relay).
• The Tor Project’s design aim of enabling secure deletion of
the browser (Sandvik, 2013) is not achieved in this version.
– References to: the installation directory, Firefox
SQLite files, bridging IPs/ports, default bookmarks,
Tor-related DLLs and Tor product information were
all recovered after the browser was deleted.
– In a scenario where the operating system paged
memory, an instance of a URL from the browsing
protocol along with references to private browsing
was found.
– The file state used by Tor to track successful launches
of the application was found after browser deletion.
Prior to being deleted, this file contained the last run
time, however, in the recovered file this timestamp
was overwritten. This suggests that Tor manages to
overwrite this data.
6.3. Forensic Implications of Using Tor
Acknowledging the above results, a forensic investigator
could prove:
• The use of Tor even after a user has attempted to delete the
browser.
• The last execution time/date.
• Evidence of pages visited during a browsing session.
• The language of the country where the server used to exit
the Tor network resides.
• That Tor was used over Firefox.
6.4. Limitations
Some limitations in the methodology of this paper can be
observed after completion. One such limitation is that the net-
working aspect of Tor was not used to aid the forensic exam-
ination. For example, Warren (2017) uses Volatility’s netscan
plugin to observe open network sockets, determining the TCP
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ports used by Tor in live forensics. This could be used to fur-
ther prove the use of Tor. Equally, time constraints in this
project meant that the individual files dumped from memory
could not be analysed. This is likely to have resulted in fur-
ther evidence of the browsing protocol. Furthermore, to find
the browsing data-leakage seen in this project, a knowledge of
unique strings related to the browsing protocol was required.
This would be unlikely in a real-life static analysis, although
if it was known that data from Tor is leaked to areas of the
Registry such as NTUSER.DAT, the same data-leakage could
be found. Finally, the experiments performed suffered from a
lack of control. With more time, the same browsing protocol
and analyses could be performed on a system running Firefox.
This would allow conclusions to be drawn about which artefacts
were attributable to Tor and which were attributable to Firefox.
From this, an assessment of whether Firefox’s implementation
of private browsing or Tor’s privacy-enhancing mechanisms led
to the data-leakage observed in the results could be made.
7. Conclusions
The limited research in the area of Tor Forensics discov-
ered during the Literature Review suggested that a need for live
forensics had become increasingly important. This was largely
due to recent papers concluding that Tor did not write brows-
ing data to disk (Warren, 2017). Prior to this, Darcie et al.
(2014) had successfully managed to retrieve files residing in
RAM from their browsing protocol, even after the browser was
deleted. This coincided with the forensic methodology pro-
posed by Dayalamurthy (2013), which also placed emphasis
on live forensics. A new methodology was proposed, which
favoured a live forensic analysis followed by a static analysis
of the virtualised test machine. This resulted in a more thor-
ough forensic process, allowing the maximum level of knowl-
edge about the browser to be gained in the limited timeframe
available.
Although previous researchers had successfully recovered
artefacts of Tor-use, a comprehensive analysis of both volatile
and non-volatile memory had yet to be completed with most of
the existing research concentrating on a singular aspect of com-
puter memory. Likewise, the idea of the Tor Browser being used
in a shared-computing scenario had yet to be fully explored.
Sandvik (2013) had contemplated this, yet it seemed inade-
quately addressed in her results. Therefore, it became obvious
that the design of an experiment which incorporated the action
of a user logging-out should be devised. It was determined that
in such a scenario, a forensic adversary would likely conduct
live forensics on the shared computer (Tsalis et al., 2017) and
the purpose of this experiment would be to determine whether
Tor could be identified running on the system and whether evi-
dence from the browsing protocol could be extracted from live
memory.
Due to the volatile nature of RAM, acquisition of live mem-
ory is rarely possible in the field. This is applicable even in
shared-computing environments, as often the user can power
cycle a shared computer without consequence. Considering
that the intended audience for this project was both users of
the browser and forensic investigators wishing to analyse it, the
omission of a subsequent static analysis would constitute an in-
complete methodology. This is especially true as a large num-
ber of Tor users will likely use their personal computer which
could be subject to seizure by a forensic adversary. There-
fore, the multi-faceted experimental design was required. This
proved successful in the end as many unexpected results were
born from the static analysis, an aspect which may have been
omitted if too much reliance had been placed on the results of
previous research.
The technique of indexing the hard drive and applying key-
word searches based on known Tor artefacts and the browsing
protocol was simple yet is something that the browser should
protect against. In particular, Perry et al. (2018) state explicitly
in their design philosophy that browsing data leakage should
not happen. This indicates that the Tor Browser does not ade-
quately protect the user from a forensic adversary.
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